General Chinh who commanded the 25th Vietnamese Infantry Division was regarded by MACV1 as one of the worst division commanders, however, his continued friendship with Premier Kỳ2 allowed him to ignore American advice with impunity, and the presence of strong US ground forces within his division tactical area made the performance of his own unit less critical to Saigon. In late 1966, a simmering dispute between Chinh and his senior US adviser Col. Cecil F. Hunnicutt became public, and Chinh went on to lecture his subordinates on the need to avoid being subverted by American wealth and power, as well as on the importance of keeping their self-respect and their loyalty to their own superiors.3
In 1964, when the Joint General Staff moved the 25th Infantry Division from Quang Ngai Province in the northern zone to Hau Nghia Province near Saigon, desertions in the division skyrocketed. Men whose families could not follow refused to go, and even those accompanied by their immediate dependents left with extreme reluctance. Long months were to pass, during which the Joint Staff transferred many men back to their home provinces and recruited others in the Saigon area before the 25th Division was again capable of anything like normal operations. Even in units that remained fixed, desertions were a perennial problem. By 1965 desertions within the Army of Vietnam were averaging about nine thousand a month, more than four times the U.S. Army's desertion rates in World War II and eight times that of the U.S. Army in the Korean War. American advisers had never seen losses of this magnitude and were deeply alarmed. Desertion rates were highest in infantry units, often amounting to 10 percent of a unit's strength each month, theoretically forcing a complete turnover of unit personnel in less than a year.4
The 25th Vietnamese Infantry Division in Duc Hoa was pretty ineffective and remarkably under-strength. I would get the unit strength reports monthly, and I would format the reports for the Senior Advisor. At one point the Division was made a priority unit and a sufficient number of replacements was provided to raise their strength level to operational readiness; however, the following reporting period again showed an alarming drop in unit strength.
I was witness to a phone conversation between our Senior Advisor and Vietnamese Brigadier General Chinh who commanded the 25th Vietnamese Infantry Division. I could hear only Colonel Arntz’s side of the conversation. “General, I cannot understand why you are losing so many men. I don’t see that many casualties taking place,” said Colonel Arntz.
A long pause while, I suppose, the general was either making excuses or embarrassed at the realization. Colonel Arntz followed with “Well, general, if that’s the case and you are experiencing an increased number of deserters, I recommend your officers address this now before the deserter rate number approaches a new unacceptable level. I will not be the only one having to explain to MACV headquarters that the 25th ARVN Infantry Division is once more under-strength.”
Another long pause before he continued. “No, that’s not what I said, general. What I mean is we have to halt this deserter rate. It's already the highest desertion rate in the ARVN forces. We need to address and halt this trend."
“Hello. Hello?” Then “General you still on the line?”
I never shared this conversation with any other team members, but someone else must have. It became a topic of conversation at the dinner table. The 25th Vietnamese Infantry Division will achieve a twenty-five percent desertion rate by end of the year, some untrained analyst at the dinner table predicted. Of course, the desertion never reached the unit's numerical designation, but the desertion rate stayed well above fifteen-plus percent for the rest of the time I spent with Advisory Team 99.
1 - Army of the Republic of Vietnam
2 - Nguyen Cao Ky (1930-2011) was the commander of South Vietnam’s air force and later president and vice president of the republic.
3 - Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965 1973 by Jeffrey J. Clarke - Pg 189
4 - Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965 1973 by Jeffrey J. Clarke - Pg 42
For cowards the road of desertion should be left open; they will carry over to the enemy nothing but their fears.- Chistrian Nestell Bovee, New York City writer
Copyright texan@atudemi.com - January 2022